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"ABANDONED LOVE": THE IMPACT OF WYATT V. STICKNEY
ON THE INTERSECTION BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS AND DOMESTIC MENTAL DISABILITY LAW
Michael L. Perlin*
INTRODUCTION
Wyatt v. Stickney' is the most important institutional rights case liti-
gated in the history of domestic mental disability law.2 It spawned copycat
litigation in multiple federal district courts and state superior courts ;3 it led
directly to the creation of Patients' Bills of Rights in most states;4 and it
inspired the creation of the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill
of Rights Act,' the Mental Health Systems Act Bill of Rights,6 and the
federally-funded Protection and Advocacy System.7 Its direct influence on
the development of the right-to-treatment doctrine abated after the Su-
preme Court's disinclination, in its 1982 decision in Youngberg v. Romeo,8
to find that right to be constitutionally mandated, but its historic role as a
beacon and inspiration has never truly faded. It has been cited (at least) an
astounding 411 times in domestic law journals. 9
However, little has been written about the influence of Wyatt on the
intersection between international human rights and mental disability law,
an intersection whose importance has grown exponentially since the ratifi-
* Michael Perlin is Director of the International Mental Disability Law Reform Project and the
Online Mental Disability Law Program at New York Law School. The author wishes to thank Rachel
Hisler for her invaluable research assistance, and his colleague, Professor Karen Owen Talley, for her
suggestions that led to the title of this article.
I. Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 344 F.
Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), af'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305
(5' Cir. 1974).
2. See generally, 2 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL §§
3A-3.1-6, at 24-79 (2d ed. 1999).
3. See id., § 3A-3.3, at 57-60.
4. Michael L. Perlin, "Everybody Is Making Love/Or Else Expecting Rain": Considering the
Sexual Autonomy Rights of Persons Institutionalized Because of Mental Disability in Forensic Hospit-
als and in Asia, 83 WASH. L. REV. 481, 487 (2008).
5. Stanley S. Herr, Representation of Clients with Disabilities: Issues of Ethics and Control, 17
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 609, 635 (1989-90).
6. Stacey A. Tovino, Psychiatric Restraint and Seclusion: Resisting Legislative Solution, 47
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 511, 542-43 (2007).
7. Herr, supra note 5, at 635; Dick Thornburgh & Ira Burnim, Dedication to Frank M. Johnson
Jr., 23 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 606, 606 (1999).
8. 457 U.S. 307 (1982); see generally 2 PERLIN, supra note 2, §§ 3A-9 to 9.9, at 87-108.
9. Westlaw search of JLR database conducted January 12, 2011.
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cation of the United Nations' Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities (CRPD).1 o In this article, I begin a preliminary exploration of
that influence, drawing four conclusions:
(1) Although Wyatt has not been cited in foreign cases, respected
commentators have articulated its importance."
(2) A study of important cases from international regional human
rights tribunals reveals its impact, both on holdings and on court
reasoning. 12
(3) Relevant sections of the CRPD have been based on Wyatt's
holdings and the institutional standards mandated by subsequent
Wyatt orders.13
(4) It is not much of a reach to predict that, in another 40 years,
Wyatt's influence on international human rights law will be seen as
profound as (or as more profound than) its influence on domestic
law.
I will first discuss the influence of Wyatt on domestic mental disability
law in the context of case law and the sociopolitical environment. Next, I
will briefly trace the development of institutional mental disability rights
law abroad from the period prior to the publication of the UN Mental Ill-
ness Principles,14 through the period following publication of that docu-
ment, through the ratification of the CRPD to present. I will then show
how Wyatt, although often in a sub silentio manner, has been the guiding
force behind those international human rights law developments that
mandate positive rights for institutionalized patients, especially in the con-
text of the CRPD. Although Wyatt is cited less and less frequently by US
10. United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, May
3, 2008 [hereinafter "CRPD"]; Michael L. Perlin, "A Change Is Gonna Come": The Implications of
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities for the Domestic Practice of
Constitutional Mental Disability Law, 29 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 483 (2009).
11. See, e.g., Gerard Quinn, Civil Commitment and the Right to Treatment under the European
Convention on Human Rights, 5 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 39-40 (1992).
12. E.g., Congo v. Ecuador, Case 11.427, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 63/99,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, doc.7 rev. at 475 (1998); Purohit and Moore v. The Gambia, Comm. No.
241/2001, 11 Int'l Hum. Rights Rep. 257 (Afr. Comm'n on Human and Peoples' Rights 2003).
13. See infra Part IV.
14. Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and for the Improvement of
Mental Healthcare, G.A. Res. 46/119, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/119/Annex (Dec. 17, 1991)
[hereinafter "MI Principles"].
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courts in the current era,15 it remains the inspiration for the most profound
international human rights advances worldwide.
The first part of the title of this paper, Abandoned Love, comes from a
lesser-known Bob Dylan song, first released in 1985 on Biograph.16 In this
"brilliant song,"l 7 Dylan sings, "Won't you let me in your room one time
'fore I finally disappear?," and, two verses later, "I march in the parade
of liberty."' 8 It is a song of "anger" and "relief," filed with "loss and
yearning."l 9 Wyatt v. Stickney may appear to have been "abandoned" by
the US Supreme Court in its Youngberg decision, but, through the vehicle
of the CRPD, we allow it to return to our "room" another time, in the
guise of international human rights law, as part of the "parade of liber-
ty." 2 0 For those of us inspired by Wyatt when we litigated in the 1970s,2 1
the subsequent years have often been filled with anger and loss and yearn-
ing. The ratification of the CRPD, however, gives us a large measure of
relief.
I. THE DOMESTIC INFLUENCE OF WYAT
Writing about Wyatt some 13 years ago, I suggested that its ultimate
legacy needed to be considered from four different perspectives: (1) fur-
ther developments in the litigation itself; (2) Wyatt's ultimate impact on
the delivery of mental disability services in Alabama; (3) Wyatt's impact
on the development of statutory law elsewhere; and (4) Wyatt's impact on
the development of constitutional law elsewhere. 22 As part of that analy-
sis, 2 3 I concluded that Wyatt was at least partially responsible for these
positive changes in the delivery of mental health services in Alabama:
population at Alabama's psychiatric hospitals declined dramatically;
environmental and safety hazards were eliminated or ameliorated; staff
attitudes toward patients changed; state expenditures on mental healthcare
increased dramatically; and in some areas, staff numbers increased signifi-
15. Wyatt was cited by US courts 132 times between 1971 and 1980, 45 times between 1980 and
1990, 35 times between 1990 and 2000, and 5 times since then. WESTLAW search conducted of
ALLCASES database, January 12, 2011.
16. See BOB DYLAN, Abandoned Love, on BIOGRAPH (Columbia Records 1975).
17. MICHAEL GRAY, SONG & DANCE MAN III: THE ART OF BOB DYLAN 22 n. 7 (2000).
18. Dylan, supra note 16.
19. OLIVER TRAGER, KEYS TO THE RAIN: THE DEFINITIVE BOB DYLAN ENCYCLOPEDIA 1 (2004).
20. On Dylan's views on "liberty" and the growth of mental disability law in general, see Mi-
chael L. Perlin & John Douard, "Equality, I Spoke That Word/As If a Wedding Vow": Mental Disa-
bility Law and How We Treat Marginalized Persons, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 9, 13-14 (2008-09).
21. See Doe v. Klein, No. L-12088-74 P.W. (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. June 29, 1977), reported
at 1 MENT. DIS. L. REP. 475 (1977) (institutional right to treatment consent order) (I litigated Doe
when I was director of the NJ Division of Mental Health Advocacy).
22. 2 PERLIN, supra note 2, §3A-3.2, at 45.
23. On subsequent developments in Wyatt, see id., § 3A-3.2a, at 45-51; see also 2 MICHAEL L.
PERLIN & HEATHER E. CUCOLO, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL (2010 Cum.
Supp), § 3A-3.2a, at 4-5.
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cantly.24 These outcomes were all measurable and empirically validated.
They demonstrated, without fear of contradiction, the "real life" effect
Wyatt had on the care and treatment of institutionalized persons with men-
tal disabilities in Alabama.
Wyatt's domestic impact outside of Alabama was significant as well,
there being "no doubt" of its "massive influence" on the development of
state-level Patients' Bills of Rights;25 the promulgation of rights-enforcing
regulations in nearly three-quarters of all states; 26 and a host of federal
legislation including Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,27 the
Mental Health Systems Act,28 the Protection and Advocacy for Individuals
with Mental Illness Act (PAIMI Act),29 and the Developmental Disabilities
Assistance and Bill of Rights Act. 3 0 The state laws inspired by Wyatt "es-
tablished baseline civil rights governing the substantive and procedural
limitations on the involuntary civil commitment process, the right to
treatment, and the right to refuse treatment."3 1 Beyond that, the Wyatt
mandate of a right to treatment in the least restrictive alternative is
"echoed in the Americans with Disabilities Act,"32 as articulated in
Olmstead v. L. C.3 3 There is no dispute that Wyatt was "the beginning of a
revolution" recognizing the rights of institutionalized persons with mental
disabilities.3
24. 2 PERLIN, supra note 2, §3A-3.2b, at 51-53.
25. Id. § 3A-3.2c, at 54.
26. See Harry C. Schnibbe, Changes in State Mental Health Service Systems Since Wyatt, in
WYATT V. STICKNEY : RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT 173, 174 (L. Ralph Jones & Richard R. Parlour,
eds. 1981) [hereinafter RETROSPECT & PROSPECT].
27. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 9401 (1980). This Advocacy title was short-lived after being enacted on October
7, 1980. It was repealed effectively on October 1, 1981 by the Reagan Administration's Omnibus
Reconciliation Act of 1981. See also 2 PERLIN, supra note 2, § 8.13 (discussing repeal).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 10801 (1994).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 6061 (2006).
31. Michael L. Perlin et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Civil Rights of Institutionalized
Mentally Disabled Persons: Hopeless Oxymoron or Path to Redemption?, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y &
L. 80, 82 (1995).
32. Thornburgh & Burnim, supra note 7, at 606. See also 2 PERLIN, supra note 2, §3A-3.2c, at
56 (Wyatt "clearly infuses [Olmsteadj").
33. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel Zinring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
34. Laura E. Hortas, Asylum Protection for the Mentally Disabled: How the Evolution of Rights
for the Mentally Ill in the United States Created a "Social Group," 20 CONN. J. INT'L L. 155, 168
(2004), (quoting JOHN LAFOND & MARY DURHAM, BACK TO THE ASYLUM 96 (1992). See also
Thornburgh & Burnim, supra note 7, at 606-07 (discussing how Wyatt "broke new constitutional
ground"); Emily A. Whitney, Correctional Rehabilitation Programs and the Adoption of International
Standards: How the United States Can Reduce Recidivism and Promote the National Interest, 18
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 777, 791 n.100 (2009) (characterizing Wyatt as a "revolutio-
nary" decision).
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And, of course, Wyatt had a "dramatic influence on constitutional and
case law developments in other jurisdictions. "5 Soon after Judge Johnson
issued his first order,3 6 similar litigation was filed in Ohio,37 Minnesota,38
Louisiana, 39 and elsewhere. After these courts began entering "Wyatt-
esque" orders,41 a second generation" of cases was filed that included
suits that focused more critically on certain of the Wyatt standards, and
suits that sought relief in areas beyond that requested in Wyatt.4 2
Subsequent cases built on the Wyatt base by extending the constitu-
tional right to treatment explicitly to include treatment in the least restric-
tive alternative. 4 3 Although U.S. Supreme Court eventually failed to con-
stitutionalize some of these holdings in the lead case of Youngberg v. Ro-
meo," the Court's resuscitation of this doctrine-in the civil case of
Olmstead v. L. C.45 and in the forensic case of Sell v. United States-
teaches us that Wyatt's influence in this area of mental disability law is
still vital. 47
Post-Youngberg case law has been mixed;48 however, a close reading
of these cases reveals that Wyatt continues to inform much of the impor-
35. 2 PERLIN, supra note 2, §3A-3.2d, at 56. See also, Cynthia Faye Barnett, Treatment Rights of
Mentally Ill Nursing Home Residents, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 578, 588 (1978) ("As dramatic as the
changes wrought by Wyatt are at the state level, its impact is not limited to Alabama.").
36. Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
37. Davis v. Watkins, 384 F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
38. Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974)
39. Gary W. v. Louisiana, 437 F. Supp. 1209 (E.D. La. 1976) (applying theory to juvenile
facility).
40. See Philipp v. Carey, 517 F. Supp. 513, 517-19 (N.D.N.Y. 1981) (collecting the cases from
across the nation).
41. See e.g., Davis, 384 F. Supp. at 1197.
42. See cases discussed in 2 PERLIN, supra note 2, §§ 3A-5 to 5.5, at 64-77, and in PERLIN &
CUCOLO, supra note 23, §§ 3A-5 to 5.5, at 6-7.
43. See Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147 (3d Cir. 1980), vacated, 457 U.S. 307 (1982); Scott
v. Plante, 641 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated, 458 U.S. 1101 (1982); see generally 2 PERLIN,
supra note 2, § 3A-4.
44. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
45. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel Zinring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999) (finding that under Title II of the
ADA, states are required to provide persons with mental disabilities community-based treatment when
such resources are available). On the relationship between Olmstead and the least restrictive alternative
doctrine, see e.g., Michael L. Perlin, "Through the Wild Cathedral Evening": Barriers, Attitudes,
Participatory Democracy, Professor tenBroek, and the Rights of Persons with Mental Disabilities, 13
TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 413, 414 (2008).
46. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) (holding that defendant has qualified right to
refuse to take antipsychotic drugs prescribed solely to render him competent to stand trial; medication
over objection is permissible where court finds treatment medically appropriate, substantially unlikely
to have side effects that may undermine the fairness of the trial, and, taking account of less intrusive
alternatives, necessary significantly to further important governmental trial-related interest). On the
relationship between Sell and the least restrictive alternative doctrine, see e.g., Michael L. Perlin,
"And My Best Friend, My Doctor/Won't Even Say What It Is I've Got": The Role and Significance of
Counsel in Right to Refuse Treatment Cases, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 735, 736 (2005).
47. On Wyatt's influence on a national level in general, see Tovino, supra note 6, at 541-45.
48. 2 PERLIN, supra note 2, §§ 3A-12 to 3A-12.3, at 111-24.
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tant judicial decisionmaking in this area of the law.49 I believe that my
conclusion of thirteen years ago still stands today:
Although the direct, precedential impact of Wyatt v. Stickney
would appear to have been dulled somewhat by the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Youngberg v. Romeo, the moral strength of
Judge Johnson's vision in Wyatt remains powerful to this day.
Wyatt's dramatic influence on subsequent case law and legislation
bears testament to its weight. As a result of Wyatt, concepts such
as staffing ratios, individual treatment plans, and environmental
standards have been regularly incorporated in the fabric of the
law. While the Supreme Court stopped far short of mandating
Wyatt standards in Youngberg, these standards remain the law in
many jurisdictions; more importantly, there have been few post-
Youngberg cutbacks in "Wyatt states."'o
It is thus no surprise that the eminent forensic psychiatrist Milton
Greenblatt has characterized Wyatt as "the most significant case in the
[history] of forensic psychiatry"5 1 and the "foundation of modem psychia-
tric jurisprudence." 52 In the words of an Alabama probate judge, it treated
persons with mental illness "as individuals with basic human rights, as
opposed to faceless masses of insanity.""
II. THE INSTITUTIONAL TREATMENT OF PERSONS WITH MENTAL
DISABILITIES IN OTHER NATIONS
Wyatt and its progeny revealed persistent and pervasive mistreatment
of persons with mental disabilities in the United States. Conditions in psy-
chiatric hospitals in most parts of the world today eerily mimic conditions
49. See e.g., Flakes v. Percy, 511 F. Supp. 1325, 1337-41 (W.D. Wis. 1981); Mahoney v.
Lensink, 550 A.2d 1088, 1093 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 569 A.2d 518
(Conn. 1990) (citing Wyatt and Youngberg); for more recent cases, see, e.g., Estate of Komninos v.
Bancroft Neurohealth, Inc., 9 A.3d 1044 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) (citing Wyatt); State ex
rel. Matin v. Bloom, 674 S.E.2d 240 (W.Va. 2009) (citing Wyatt v. Aderholt). See Lee W. Badger, L.
Ralph Jones & Richard R. Parlour, Wyatt v. Stickney: Context and Consequence, in RETROSPECT &
PROSPECT, supra note 26, at 211, 218 (Wyatt-type suits "have improved patient care in state hospitals
[in many states]"; courts now serve as "[benchmark] agent[s] of change"); Stephen J. Ellmann, Test
Cases: Legal Battles and Latent Effects, in RETROSPECT & PROSPECT, supra note 26, at 181, 189
("[Wyatt] has built a consensus on the rights of the mentally ill and the mentally retarded"); Edward
Kaufman, The Right to Treatment Suit as an Agent of Change, 136 Am. J. Psychiatry 1428 (1979).
50. 2 PERUN, supra note 2, §3A-6, COMMENT, at 78-79.
51. Milton Greenblatt, Foreword in RETROSPECT & PROSPECT, supra note 26, at ix.
52. Id. at x; see also, 2 PERLIN, supra note 2, §3A-3. 1, at 24 (Wyatt is "one of the most influen-
tial mental disability law cases ever filed.").
53. Reese McKinney, Involuntary Commitment: A Delicate Balance, 20 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J.
36, 37 (2006).
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in United States facilities at the time Wyatt was brought. 4 Several years
before Wyatt, the then-President of the American Psychiatric Association
characterized such hospitals as "bankrupt, beyond remedy. " A few years
after Wyatt, when the chairman of the legal action committee of the Na-
tional Association of Retarded Children (now the ARC) characterized the
Pennhurst State School 56 as "Dachau, without ovens,"5 7 there was never
any accusation of exaggeration. Subsequently, lawyers began to "repli-
cate" the US experience in Eastern Europe and other parts of the world to
begin the transformation of mental disability law from a medical to a legal
model.
There is a remarkable overlap between the body of decisions that de-
fine U.S. constitutional mental disability law and the body of international
human rights standards that mandate humane treatment of persons with
mental disabilities. 59 The revolution that Wyatt began has largely constitu-
tionalized virtually every aspect of the involuntary civil commitment and
release process as well as most "pressure points" in the course of institu-
tionalization: the right to treatment, the right to refuse treatment, the right
to the least restrictive alternative course of treatmenti 0
54. Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Treatment of People with Mental Illness
in Eastern Europe: Construing International Human Rights Law, 21 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
537 (2002); Michael L. Perlin, International Human Rights Law and Comparative Mental Disability
Law: The Universal Factors, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 333, 347 (2007). The cruelty of condi-
tions at the hospitals that were the focus of the Wyatt litigation cannot be overstated. See Wyatt, 344 F.
Supp. at 393 n. 13 ("A few of the atrocious incidents cited at the hearing in this case include the fol-
lowing: (a) a resident was scalded to death by hydrant water; (b) a resident was restrained in a strait
jacket for nine years in order to prevent hand and finger sucking; (c) a resident was inappropriately
confined in seclusion for a period of years, and (d) a resident died from the insertion by another resi-
dent of a running water hose into his rectum. Each of these incidents could have been avoided had
adequate staff and facilities been available.").
55. Harry Solomon, Presidental Address: The American Psychiatric Association in Relation to
American Psychiatry, 115 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 1, 7 (1958). Three years later, a witness testified at a
Congressional hearing that "[slome [state hospital] physicians I interviewed frankly admitted that the
animals of nearby piggeries were better housed, fed and treated than many of the patients on their
wards." Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill, Hearings Before the Senate Subcommittee on Con-
stitutional Rights of the Judiciary 87"' Cong., 2" Sess. 40-42(1961) (statement of Albert Deutsch),
quoted in Perlin et al., supra note 31, at 97.
56. See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) (holding that the
Developmental Disabilities Bill of Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 6010) was merely a federal/state grant
program and that neither the right to treatment nor the least restrictive alternative sections of the bill of
rights was enforceable in private action); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89
(1984) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment bars federal relief in a right-to-community service case
due to federalism concerns). Pennhurst was the facility that housed Nicholas Romeo, the plaintiff in
Youngberg. 457 U.S. at 310-12.
57. LEOPOLD LIPPMAN & 1. IGNANCY GOLDBERG, THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION: ANATOMY OF THE
PENNSYLVANIA CASE AND ITS IMPLICATION FOR EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 17 (1973), quoted in Mi-
chael L. Perlin, Competency, Deinstitutionalization, and Homelessness: A Story of Marginalization, 28
HOUS. L. REV. 63, 100 n. 215 (1991).
58. Winick, supra note 54, at 539.
59. Perlin, supra note 54, at 347.
60. Perlin et al., supra note 31, at 96-103.
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These actions followed earlier developments in the United Nations.61
In 1948, that body underscored its commitment to human rights by adopt-
ing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948. As
stated in the Preamble, the UDHR sets forth a common standard of
achievement for all peoples and nations. Its primary authors drew upon
established religious and secular philosophical traditions worldwide in
crafting provisions that recognize the inherent, universal, and transcendent
nature of human rights.62 Professor David Kinley has thus concluded that
human rights "are not only compatible with democracy, they are essential
to its functioning and survival."63 Subsequent declarations followed in the
same vein: the declaration of 1981 as the International Year of Disabled
Persons,"' the establishment by the United Nations General Assembly of
65 ththe World Programme of Action Concerning Disabled Persons, and the
declaration of 1983 to 1992 to be the Decade of Disabled Persons.66 As
part of these efforts, the United Nations Human Rights Commission ap-
pointed two special rapporteurs to investigate and report on the human
rights of persons with mental disabilities, 6 7 and in 1991 the General As-
sembly adopted the Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental
Illness and for the Improvement of Mental Health Care (MI Principles).68
The MI Principles established the most comprehensive international human
rights standards at that time for persons with mental disabilities, and their
adoption was a critical global step in recognizing mental disability rights
issues within the human rights arena.69
61. See MICHAEL L. PERLIN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND MENTAL DISABILITY LAW:
WHEN THE SILENCED ARE HEARD, chapter 3 (2011) (forthcoming 2011).
62. See generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND
COMPARATIVE MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 244-45 (2006).
63. David Kinley, Human Rights Fundamentalisms, 29 SYDNEY L. REV. 545, 559 (2007) (empha-
sis added).
64. G.A. Res. 31/123, 11, U.N. Doc. AIRES/31/123 (Dec. 16, 1976).
65. G.A. Res. 45/91, U.N. Doc A/RES/45/91 (Dec. 14, 1990).
66. G.A. Res. 39/26, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/26 (Nov. 23, 1984).
67. United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
DISABLED PERSONS, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/31 (1993) (report by Leandro Despouy); United
Nations, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, PRINCIPLES,
GUIDELINES AND GUARANTEES FOR THE PROTECTION OF PERSONS DETAINED ON GROUNDS OF
MENTAL ILL-HEALTH OR SUFFERING FROM MENTAL DISORDER, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/17/Rev. 1 (1997) (report by Erica-Irene Daes).
68. MI Principles, supra note 14.
69. On how the MI Principles became the "centerpiece of the human rights based approach to
mental health care" in Australia, see Neil Rees, International Human Rights Obligations and Mental
Health Review Tribunals, 10 PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. & L. 33 (2003). See also Terry Carney, Mental
Health Law in Postmodern Society: Time for New Paradigms? 10 PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. & L. 12
(2003). But see Tina Minkowitz, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Dis-
abilities and the Right to be Free from Nonconsensual Psychiatric Interventions, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT'L
L. & COM. 405, 407 (2007) (criticizing MI Principles for not being sufficiently protective of the rights
of persons with psychosocial disabilities, especially in the context of the right to refuse treatment);
T.W. Harding, Human Rights Law in the Field of Mental Health: A Critical Review, 101 ACTA
128 [Vol. 35
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Adoption of the MI Principles was spurred on by the work done by
Eric Rosenthal and his colleagues in Mental Disability Rights International
in Central and Eastern Europe. 7 0 Then, in 1993, Rosenthal and Rubenstein
wrote International Human Rights Advocacy Under the "Principles for the
Protection of Persons with Mental Illness,"71  the first publication of a
theoretical article exploring the relationship between international human
rights law and mental disability law in the specific context of the MI Prin-
ciples. 7 2 Rosenthal and Rubenstein's article was the first detailed interna-
tional statement of the rights of persons with mental illness and was the
first awareness on the part of the United Nations that this most margina-
lized population was entitled to basic human rights.73 The MI Principles
reflected many of the core rights that had been articulated in the Wyatt
opinions, 74 including specifically the right to treatment in the least restric-
tive alternative.75 By adopting these principles, the UN "internationalized"
mental disability law rights.76
In the post-Wyatt years, scholars interpreted other international docu-
ments similarly to draw on Wyatt's spirit. While characterizing the Euro-
pean Court's jurisprudence as "still . . . undeveloped," noting that con-
struction of Article 5 of the ECHR has been mixed,77 Professor Lawrence
Gostin argued forcefully that a theory supporting a "right to therapeutic
conditions [of confinement]" can be articulated under Article 5, articulat-
ing in his reasoning a line of argument that tracks nearly perfectly the quid
PSYCHIATRICA SCANDINAVICA 24, 24 (2000) (discussing how MI Principles are "basically flawed,"
also specifically referring to the right to refuse treatment).
70. See Tovino, supra note 6, at 540 n.194-95. The group is now known as Disability Rights
International. See http://www.disabilityrightsintl.org/.
71. Eric Rosenthal & Leonard S. Rubenstein, International Human Rights Advocacy under the
"Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness", 16 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 257
(1993).
72. See PERLIN, supra note 61, chapter 1; Michael L. Perlin & Eva Szeli, Mental Health Law
and Human Rights: Evolution and Contemporary Challenges, in MENTAL HEALTH AND HUMAN
RIGHTS (Michael Dudley ed. 2011) (forthcoming 2011); Michael L. Perlin & Eva Szeli, Mental Health
Law and Human Rights: Evolution, Challenges and the Promise of the New Convention, in UNITED
NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES: MULTIDISCIPLINARY
PERSPECTIVES 241 (Jukka Kumpuvuori & Martin Scheinen, eds. 2010).
73. See PERLIN, supra note 61, chapter 1.
74. Rosenthal & Rubenstein, supra note 71, at 259-61.
75. See Lawrence 0. Gostin & Lance Gable, The Human Rights of Persons with Mental Disabili-
ties: A Global Perspective on the Application of Human Rights Principles to Mental Health, 63 MD. L.
REV. 20, 38 n. 124 (2004) (discussing MI Principle 9).
76. Rosenthal & Rubenstein, supra note 71, at 269. See id., citing Louis HENKIN, THE AGE OF
RIGHTS 17 (1990) (Internationalization refers to the "politico-legal" process by which rights become
accepted by the international community as "a proper subject for . . . international law."). See also
Harold Hongju Koh, Different But Equal: The Human Rights of Persons with Intellectual Disabilities,
63 MD. L. REV. 1, 11 (2004) (characterizing Wyatt as part of the "transnational legal process").
77. European Convention on Human Rights, art. 5(4), Aug. 8, 1956, (amended June 1, 2010)
("Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings
by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if
the detention is not lawful.").
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pro quo rationale basis of Wyatt: "If a person is to be deprived of liberty,
not as punishment for a criminal offense, but because of the need for ther-
apy, then government should have a duty to provide minimally adequate
treatment." 7 8 In the same vein, Professor Gerard Quinn specifically looked
to the litigation strategy in Wyatt-and its statutory-based predecessor,
Rouse v. Cameron79 -to "point the way to success under the [European]
Convention [for finding a right to treatment]." 80
Similarly, Article 12(1) of the ICCPR recognizes the right to the
"highest attainable standard of . . . mental health."8' Professor Terry Car-
ney and his colleagues have linked this right to the right to treatment, cit-
ing Wyatt as "a paradigmatic example of institutional litigation which led
to a marked improvement in treatment standards in line with the court
order." 82
Wyatt has also been seen as providing ammunition for broader-based
rights under the domestic law of other nations.83 In discussing the need for
an overhaul of New Zealand's mental health law, Professor John Dawson
specifically linked Wyatt's right to treatment rationale to the draft Bill of
84Rights' guarantee of humane conditions for detained persons.
It is clear: both directly and indirectly, Wyatt inspired the development
of substantive international mental disability law, especially as it related to
institutionalized persons, and this inspiration has been pronounced by res-
pected scholars and critics.
III. MENTAL DISABILITY CASE LAW OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES
The prevailing human rights conventions, all linked to the UDHR,"
create judicial or quasi-judicial institutions that are given the responsibility
of interpreting, administering, and applying "an entire regime of rules
78. Lawrence 0. Gostin, Human Rights of Persons with Disabilities: The European Convention of
Human Rights, 23 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 125, 153-54 (2000); see also Wyatt, 503 F.2d at 1312
("Treatment had to be provided as the quid pro quo society had to pay as the price of the extra safety
it derived from the denial of individuals' liberty.").
79. 373 F.2d 451, 455 (D.C. Cir. 1966); see also 2 PERLIN, supra note 2, §§ 3A-2.2 to 2.3, at
13-20.
80. Quinn, supra note 11, at 38-39; see also id. at 48-49 ("Given the overriding concern with
autonomy in any regime of rights, the negative right to liberty could require positive rights to care and
treatment in therapeutic environments once liberty has been lost under article 5(1)(e).").
81. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 12, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S.
171, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/englisbllaw/cepr.htm.
82. See Terry Carney, David Tait & Fleur Beaupert, Pushing the Boundaries: Realising Rights
Through Mental Health Tribunal Processes?, 30 SYDNEY L. REv. 329, 344 (2008).
83. See Danielle Elyce-Hirsch, A Defense of Structural Injunctive Remedies in South African Law,
9 OR. REV. INT'L L. 1, 60-61 n. 127-28 (2007) (analyzing judicial decisionmaking in law reform cases
in South Africa and discussing the institutional oversight component of the Wyatt cases).
84. John Dawson, Fundamental Rights and the Mentally Disabled, 6 OTAGO L. REv. 291, 301
(1986).
85. See PERLIN, supra note 61.
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which each of these treaties embodies." 8 6 In this section, I will briefly
survey developments in other regions of the world beyond the United
States.8
A. Europe
In a broad context, Professors Laurence Helfer and Anne-Marie
Slaughter have characterized the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) as a "remarkable and surprising success." 88 As noted above, Ar-
ticle 5 of the ECHR guarantees the right to liberty and security of the per-
son, 89 mandates the provision of a "speedy" review of the detention by an
independent court or tribunal, and provides an enforceable remedy in
damages to those who are detained in a manner that contravenes the Con-
vention.90
However, this Article is in no way a panacea to prevent all violations
of human rights of persons with disabilities. By way of example, in a care-
fully-nuanced article, Professors Lawrence Gostin and Lance Gable focus
on two important problems that appear to fall outside of the scope of the
Convention: confinement of nonprotesting patients and compulsory super-
vision in the community. 91 The ECHR also-in Article 3's prohibition of
inhuman and degrading treatment-creates "a mechanism for monitoring
the conditions of confinement." 92
86. Gabriel M. Wilner, Reflections on Regional Human Rights Law, 25 GA. J. INT'L. & COMP.
L. 407, 408 (1996).
87. See generally, PERLIN, supra note 61, Chapter 3. There is no regional human rights tribunal
or commission in Asia. See id., chapter 8; see also Michael L. Perlin & Yoshikazu Ikehara, Promot-
ing Social Change in East Asia: The Movement to Create a Disability Rights Tribunal and the Promise
of International Online, Distance Learning (N.Y.L.S. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 10/11 #17,
2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1743741 [hereinafter, Perlin & Ikehara, Promoting
Social Change]. This paper was presented at the University of Hong Kong for the inaugural confe-
rence of the East Asia Law and Society Association. See Carole J. Petersen, Inclusive Education and
Conflict Resolution: Building a Model to Implement Article 24 of the Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities in the Asia Pacific, 40 H.K.L.J. 481, 511 (2010), discussing Michael L.
Perlin and Yoshikazu Ikehara, Creation of a Disability Rights Tribunal for Asia and the Pacific: Its
Impact on China?, paper presented at the European China Studies Association Fifth Annual Confe-
rence, Copenhagen, June 2010 (on identical issue).
88. Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational
Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 276 (1997).
89. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 77, at art. 5(i). Note that this is subject to
limited circumstances in which governments may justifiably deprive persons "of unsound mind" of
their liberty. Id.
90. See PETER BARTLETT, OLIVER LEWIS & OLIVER THOROLD, MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (2007) (providing a comprehensive evaluation of all
ECHR case law as it applies to persons with mental disabilities).
91. Gostin & Gable, supra note 75, at 59.
92. Id. at 78; see also BARTLETT, LEWIS & THOROLD, supra note 90, at 112 (discussing how
Article 10 of the Council of Europe Recommendations regarding the Rights of Persons with Mental
Disorder "import[s] a duty on the part of States to provide a reasonable standard of health care to
persons with mental disabilities.").
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Professor David Hewitt has concluded that the European Court on
Human Rights "has interpreted the ECHR very restrictively in psychiatric
cases," 93 considering specifically cases that characterized the handcuffing
of patients as "therapeutically necessary "94 or sanctioned the use of seclu-
sion for "disciplinary" purposes. 95 Notwithstanding this gloomy analysis,
Professor Gerard Quinn has concluded that the due process protections of
the "negative right to liberty . . . are very robust under the Convention." 9 6
Professor Bruce Winick bridges the gap between Hewitt and Quinn by
arguing that, even in the absence of case law, many of the ongoing "ab-
usive practices" still common in Eastern Europe97 "can be understood to
violate the [ECHR] and other evolving principles of international human
rights law." 98 According to Winick, the remedy for these abuses is a
"healthy dose of international human rights law and therapeutic jurispru-
dence. "99
Several cases decided by the European Court of Human Rights illumi-
nate this tension. In Winterwerp v. Netherlands, the Court found that in
order to detain "persons of unsound mind" in accordance with Article 5 of
the European Convention, there must be a finding that the disorder re-
quires confinement, and the disorder must be diagnosed using objective
medical expertise."1 The ECHR also found that it is essential for the per-
son concerned to have access to a court and the opportunity to be heard
either in person or, where necessary, through some form of representa-
tion.'0o In Aerts v. Belgium, the Court concluded that the ECHR provided
a right to be held in an institution not destructive of the individual's mental
health.10 2 Profs. Gostin and Gable note that this case suggests that "per-
sons with mental illness must be confined in a minimally therapeutic envi-
ronment."103 In Herczegfalvy v. Austria, the ECHR noted that the position
of inferiority and powerlessness typical of patients confined to psychiatric
hospitals calls for increased vigilance. Although ultimately the ECHR did
93. David Hewitt, Do Human Rights Impact on Mental Health Law?, 151 NEw L.J. 1278, 1278
(2001).
94. Id. (discussing Herczegfalvy v. Austria, App. No. 10533/83, 15 Eur. H.R. Rep. 437 (1992)).
95. Id. (discussing Dhoest v. Belgium, App. No. 10448/83, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 97 (1988)).
96. Quinn, supra note 11, at 48; see also Timothy W. Harding, The Application of the European
Convention of Human Rights to the Field of Psychiatry, 12 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 245, 260-62
(1989) (listing most important principles established in ECHR cases involving individuals being com-
mitted to psychiatric hospitals or institutionalized in such facilities); see generally BARTLETT, LEWIS &
THOROLD, supra note 90.
97. See generally Winick, supra note 54; see also Perlin, supra note 54.
98. Winick, supra note 54, at 572.
99. Id.; see also PERLIN, supra note 61, chapter 9 (arguing that Winick's insights must be taken
seriously by scholars and policymakers in this area).
100. Winterwerp v. Netherlands, App. No. 6301/73, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 387 at 1 39 (1979).
101. Id.
102. Aerts v. Belgium, App. No. 25357/94, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 50 (1998). See also BARTLETr,
LEWIS & THOROLD, supra note 90, at 114.
103. Gostin & Gable, supra note 75, at 87-88.
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not find a violation of Article 3, it noted that use of handcuffs and security
beds were "worrying." Professor Hewitt is especially critical of this
decision. After Herczegfalvy, he charges, "[iut is hard to think of a single
accepted psychiatric practice that might breach [Article] 3."o105
Other cases illustrate other aspects of the ECHR.106 While Article
5(2)'s provision that everyone arrested must be given "the reasons for his
arrest and the charge against him" appears to be self-limiting to the crimi-
nal setting, the court in Van der Leer v. Netherlands held that it applied to
all detentions and was thus breached when a patient was not informed that
her stay in a hospital as a voluntary patient had been converted to a deten-
tion ordered by a court.10 7 The European Court has found that ordering
detention in a psychiatric institution without prior medical opinion violates
the European Convention, that mental disability must be of sufficient se-
riousness to justify deprivation of liberty,os and that individuals have a
right, under Article 5, to initiate review of detention.1 09 In E v. Norway,
the European Court of Human Rights has found that a delay of eight
weeks violates the right to speedy review by a court."10 And in Megyeri v.
Germany, the court found that for periodic review of commitment to be
effective, there might need to be procedural safeguards present; the court
found a breach of the European Convention where no lawyer was assigned
to represent the patient in question."' There must also be judicial process
involved in determining whether detention under Article 5 is lawful.112
104. Herczegfalvy v. Austria, 15 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 1 83.
105. Hewitt, supra note 93, at 1278.
106. See generally Mary Donnelly, From Autonomy to Dignity: Treatment for Mental Disorders
and the Focus for Patient Rights, 26 LAW IN CONTEXT 37 (2008); see also BARTLETT, LEWIS &
THOROLD, supra note 90.
107. Van der Leer v. Netherlands, App. No. 11509/85, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 567, 573-574 (1990);
Kris Gledhill, Human Rights Instruments and Mental Health Law: The English Experience of the
Incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 359,
366-67 (2007) (discussing Van der Leer).
108. See Varbanov v. Bulgaria, 2000-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 457 (2000). Varbanov is discussed exten-
sively in Krassimir Kanev, State, Human Rights, and Mental Health in Bulgaria, 21
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 435 (2002).
109. Rakevich v. Russia, Eur. Ct. H.R. 558 (2003).
110. E. v. Norway, App. No. 11701/85, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 30, 57-58 (1990); see also Gostin &
Gable, supra note 75, at 73-74.
111. Megyeri v. Germany, App No.13770/88, 15 Eur. H.R. Rep. 584, 590-592 (1992); see also
Gledhill, supra note 107, at 367-68.
112. X v. United Kingdom, App. No. 6998/75, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 188, 206-207(1981). For a
helpful discussion of the X case, see Laurence 0. Gostin, Human Rights, Judicial Review, and the
Mentally Disordered Offender, CiuM. L. REV. 779 (1982). For other cases that find violations of
Article 5, see e.g., Kudla v. Poland, 2000-XI, Eur. Ct. H.R. 510; Nevmerzhitsky v. Ukraine, 2005-
II, Eur. Ct. H.R. 210; H.L. v. United Kingdom, 2004-IX, Eur. Ct. H.R. 471 . For cases finding
violations of Article 3 (the right to not be subjected to torture or inhumane or degrading treatment or
punishment), see e.g., Peers v. Greece, 2001-III, 2852/95, Eur. Ct. H.R.; Price v. United Kingdom,
2001-VII, Eur. Ct. H.R. 458; Keenan v. United Kingdom, 2001-Ill, Eur. Ct. H.R. 242. For cases
finding violations of Article 8 (the right to respect for one's private life and family life in both home
and correspondence), see e.g., Storck v. Germany, Eur. Ct. H.R. 406 (2005); Y.F. v. Turkey, Eur.
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In the most recent litigation-a potentially significant procedural deci-
sion-the European Court of Human Rights agreed to hear a case concern-
ing a Bulgarian citizen with a psychosocial disability."' The court found
that the plaintiff, who was partially deprived of his legal capacity and in-
stitutionalized without his consent, could proceed with his case.' 14 The
plaintiff, who had never been evaluated to determine whether he was ca-
pable of living on his own, was placed in the guardianship of the institu-
tion's director who was given authority to control the patient's finances
and identity papers and to determine his place of residence."' The plaintiff
alleged violations of his rights under the ECHR, including a violation of
his right not to be subject to inhuman and degrading treatment, his right to
liberty, his right to a fair hearing, his right to respect for home and private
life, and his right to an effective remedy.1 16
Notwithstanding this array of cases, Professor Peter Bartlett and his
colleagues conclude that the number of cases remains "miniscule, set
against the number of people with mental disabilities within ECHR territo-
ry whose circumstances engage Convention guarantees."1 17
B. South America
Rosario Victor Congo was a 48-year-old Ecuadorian who died of mal-
nutrition, hydroelectrolitic imbalance, and heart and lung failure as a re-
sult of Ecuador's gross negligence and willful acts.' 1 ' Specifically, Congo
was beaten with a club on the scalp by a guard, deprived of any medical
treatment, and placed in isolation naked and virtually cut off from com-
munication.
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights found that the
State violated Congo's right to humane treatment under Article 5 of the
American Convention on Human Rights and determined that Article 5 of
the American Convention must be interpreted in light of the MI Principles:
The Commission considers that in the present case the guarantees
established under Article 5 of the American Convention must be
Ct. H.R. 291 (2003). For a case finding a violation of Article 13 (the right to an effective
remedy in the event that one's Convention rights have been violated), see Keenan, 2001-III, Eur. Ct.
H.R. 242. For a discussion of cases finding violations of Article 2 (the right to life and the few excep-
tions that exist to this right), see BARTLETr, LEWIS & THOROLD, supra note 90, at 140-44.
113. See Stanev v. Bulgaria, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1182 (2010).
114. See id. at 121.
115. See id. at 1 12, 16.
116. See id. at 87-90.
117. BARTLETr, LEWIS & THOROLD, supra note 90, at 254.
118. Congo v. Ecuador, Case 11.427, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 63/99,
OEA/Ser.L/VIII.95, doc.7 rev. at 475 (1998).
119. Id. at 1f 9-10.
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interpreted in light of the Principles for the Protection of Persons
with Mental Illness and for the Improvement of Mental Health
Care. These principles were adopted by the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly as a guide to the interpretation in matters of protec-
tion of the human rights of persons with mental disabilities, which
this body regards as a particularly vulnerable group.120
In a subsequent footnote, the Inter-American Commission underscored
this point:
The UN Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Ill-
ness are regarded as the most complete standards for protection of
the rights of persons with mental disability at the international lev-
el. These Principles serve as a guide to States in the design and/or
reform of mental health systems and are of utmost utility in eva-
luating the practices of existing systems. Mental Health Principle
23 establishes that each State must adopt the legislative, judicial,
administrative, educational, and other measures that may be neces-
sary to implement them. These Principles are also standards of as-
sessment that make international human rights monitoring by non-
governmental organizations more possible. 121
Continuing, the Inter-American Commission found that the solitary
confinement of Congo constituted inhuman and degrading treatment in
violation of Article 5(2) of the American Convention, especially in light of
the fact that he was left in isolation unable to satisfy his basic needs. 122
Thus, the State violated Congo's right to "be treated with respect for the
inherent dignity of the human person." 23 Further, the Inter-American
Commission found the State responsible for the physical assault committed
by one of its agents and a State duty to ensure the physical, mental, and
moral integrity of persons suffering from mental illness.124
The Inter-American Commission also found that the State violated Ar-
ticle 4(1) of the American Convention because it failed to take measures
within its power so that a person who "partly because of his state of health
and in part owing to injuries inflicted on him by a State agent, was de-
fenseless, isolated and under its control" was ensured the right to life. 125
Finally, the Commission found that, under Article 25(1) of the American
120. Id. at 1 54.
121. Id. n. 8.
122. Id. at 1 59.
123. Id.
124. Id, at 1 62.
125. Id. at 1 84.
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Convention, Congo had a right to judicial protection which the State vi-
olated, since there were no judicial proceedings opened to investigate and
establish the responsibilities for the injuries to and death of Congo. 126 As a
result of this case, the Commission recommended that the persons respon-
sible for the violations be punished, that the family of Congo be compen-
sated, that medical and psychiatric care for persons suffering from mental
illness be provided, and that specialists be assigned to the penitentiary
system to identify psychiatric disorders of those confined.127
Also, in Ximenes-Lopes v. Brazil, a man died while being held for
psychiatric treatment at a private psychiatric clinic/rest home that was op-
erating as part of the Brazilian public health system. Responding to alle-
gations that he was abused and tortured and that these actions led to his
premature death, the Inter-American Court:
[Brazil's duties] to respect and guarantee protection norms and to
ensure the effectiveness of rights go beyond the relationship be-
tween their agents and the individuals under the jurisdiction the-
reof, since they are embodied in the positive duty of the State to
adopt such measures as may be necessary to ensure the effective
protection of human rights in inter-individual relationships.1 29
The court concluded that Brazil owed a special duty to protect life and
personal integrity, notwithstanding the fact that the facility was a private
one.130 It found that via the Convention, private entities acting in a state
capacity in the provision of health care were under its jurisdiction, where,
as in this case, the state failed adequately to regulate and supervise
them. 13 1 It also required Brazil to establish educational programs for staff
working in mental health institutions. 132
Again, there can be little doubt that Wyatt - albeit sub silentio -
served as a major inspiration for these rights-expanding cases.
126. Id. at 1 97.
127. Id. at 103.
128. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 149 (July 4, 2006).
129. Id. at 1 85.
130. Id. at 1 89.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1 250. For favorable commentary about the Ximenes-Lopes case, see e.g., Steven R.
Keener & Javier Vasquez, A Life Worth Living: Enforcement of the Right to Health Through the Right
to LIfe in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 40 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 595 (2009); Jo
M. Pasqualucci, The Right to a Dignified Life (Vida Digna): The Integration of Economic and Social
Rights with Civil and Political Rights in the Inter-American Human Rights System, 31 HASTINGS INT'L
& COMP. L. REv. 1 (2008).
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C. Africa
In Purohit and Moore v. The Gambia,133 the African Commission on
Human and Peoples' Rights found that the Gambia violated various provi-
sions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights by the way it
treated persons with mental disabilities in the Gambia and by the Lunatic
Detention Act of the Gambia (LDA).13 4 Although it does not receive
communications until local remedies are exhausted, the African Commis-
sion found in this case that the existent remedies unrealistic for persons
with mental disabilities. 135
In determining the merits of Purohit and Moore, the African Commis-
sion found that when States ratify the African Charter, they undertake a
responsibility to bring their "domestic laws and practice in conformity
with the African Charter."1 36 Further, the Commission found that Articles
2 and 3, guaranteeing equal protection and anti-discrimination, were non-
derogable rights. 137 Thus, Gambia violated these rights through the im-
plementation of the LDA, which detained more people from poor back-
grounds and provided only those charged with capital offenses with legal
assistance. 138
The LDA failed to conform with the African Charter by its classifica-
tion of persons with mental disabilities as "lunatics" and "idiots." The
African Commission found that these terms dehumanized persons with
mental disabilities and took away their inherent right to human dignity in
violation of Article 5.139 Like the Inter-American Commission, the African
Commission turned to the MI Principles in reaching this conclusion. In
addition, the African Commission found that the LDA violated Article 6
of the African Charter because the LDA authorized detention on the basis
of opinions by general medical practitioners, lacked fixed detention pe-
riods, and precluded review or appeal.'4 In Purohit and Moore, the
Commission also found the right to health crucial and "as a result of their
condition and by virtue of their disabilities," persons with mental disabili-
ties should be accorded special treatment enabling them to sustain the op-
timum level of independence in accordance with both the African Charter
and MI Principles.141
133. Purohit and Moore v. The Gambia, Comm. No. 241/2001, 11 Int'l Hum. Rights Rep. 257
(Aft. Comm'n on Human and Peoples' Rights 2003).
134. Id. at 71.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1 42.
137. Id. at 1.54.
138. Id. at 1 53-54.
139. Id. at 159.
140. Id. at 168.
141. Id. at 1 81.
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In a recent paper in which I argued for the creation of a disability
rights tribunal for Asia and the Pacific,1 42 I relied on the decisions in Con-
go and Purohit to support my position:
[E]xperiences in other regions show that similarly-situated courts
and commissions have been powerful forces in mandating the
practical implementation . . . of other UN Conventions and trea-
ties . . . We do not believe there is a single person in the world
who believes, by way of example, that the high courts of Ecuador
or Gambia would have decided the Congo or the Purohit cases the
way that the interregional bodies did. 143
I believe that Wyatt was an inspiration for both of these decisions, and
for the judicial bodies' conclusions that the State violated Congo's right to
"be treated with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person"14
and Gambia's actions that took away plaintiffs' inherent right to human
dignity .145 But, of course, the universe of such cases is, in the words of
Professor Peter Bartlett and his colleagues "miniscule." 14 6 The ratification
of the U.N. Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities, howev-
er, may change that dramatically.
IV. THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE
WITH DISABILITIES
There is no question that the most important international development
in this area of law and policy to date has been the ratification of the UN
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). 147 The
"wide scope",14  of the "holistic" 49 CRPD furthers the human rights ap-
142. See Perlin & Ikehara, Promoting Social Change, supra note 87.
143. Id. at 23.
144. Congo v. Ecuador, Case 11.427, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 63/99 at 1 52,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, doc.7 rev. at 475 (1998).
145. Purohit and Moore, 11 Int'l Hum. Rights Rep. 257.
146. BARTLETr, LEWIS & THOROLD, supra note 90, at 254. See also E. v. Norway, App. No.
11701/85, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 30, 57-58 (1990).
147. CPRD, supra note 10. See PERLIN, supra note 61, chapter 7; Perlin, supra note 10; Janet E.
Lord & Michael Ashley Stein, The Domestic Incorporation of Human Rights Law and the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 83 WASH. L. REV. 449 (2008); Michael
Ashley Stein & Janet E. Lord, Jacobus tenBroek, Participatory Justice, and the UN Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 13 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 167 (2008). See also Annegret Kiimpf,
The Disabilities Convention and its Consequences for Mental Health Laws in Australia, 26 LAW IN
CONTEXT 10 (2008) (discussing the relationship between the CRPD and other United Nations Conven-
tions and Treaties in this context).
148. Richard Carver, A New Answer to an Old Question: National Human Rights Institutions and
the Domestication of International Law, 10 HUM. RTs. L. REV. 1, 26 (2010).
149. Michael Ashley Stein, A Quick Overview of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities and Its Implications for Americans with Disabilities, 31 MENTAL &
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proach to disability and recognizes the right of people with disabilities to
equality in most aspects of life. The CRPD "responds to traditional mod-
els, situates disability within a social model framework and sketches the
full range of human rights that apply to all human beings, all with a par-
ticular application to the lives of persons with disabilities.",o It provides a
framework for insuring that mental health laws "fully recognize the rights
of those with mental illness." 51 It categorically affirms the social model of
disabilityl5 2 by describing it as a condition arising from "interaction with
various barriers [that] may hinder [the individual's] full and effective par-
ticipation in society on an equal basis with others" instead of inherent limi-
tations. 15 3 It also reconceptualizes mental health rights as disability
rights1 54 and extends existing human rights to take into account the specific
rights experiences of persons with disabilities. 55
In Professor Gerard Quinn's eloquent phrase, the CRPD provides a
"moral compass for change,"l 56 reflecting a "paradigm shift" in the way
we think about and treat persons with disabilities.157 He characterizes it as
a "beacon for an international consensus on justice and disability." 5 1 Pro-
fessor Lisa Waddington implies it ushers in a "new era in human rights
protection."l59 Professor Jacqueline Laing says it "brings hope to the vul-
nerable." 1 60 Professor Penelope Weller argues that it illustrates "profound
shifts both in the conception of human rights and the implementation of
human rights in public policy domains. ,161
PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 679, 679 (2007); Fr6d6ric M6gret, The Disabilities Convention: To-
wards a Holistic Concept of Rights, 12 INT'L J. HUM. RTS. 261, 271 (2008).
150. Janet E. Lord & Michael Ashley Stein, Social Rights and the Relational Value of the Rights to
Participate in Sport, Recreation, and Play, 27 B.U. INT'L L.J. 249, 256 (2009); see also Ronald
McCallum, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Some Reflec-
tions (2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1563883.
151. Bernadette McSherry, International Trends in Mental Health Laws: Introduction, 26 LAW IN
CONTEXT 1, 8 (2008).
152. See Janet E. Lord, David Suozzi & Allyn L. Taylor, Lessons from the Experience of U.N.
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Addressing the Democratic Deficit in Global
Health Governance, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 564, 568 (2010).
153. CPRD, supra note 10, at art. 1; see also id. at preamble, (e).
154. Phil Fennell, Human Rights, Bioethics, and Mental Disorder, 27 MED. & L. 95 (2008).
155. Fr6d6ric M6gret, The Disabilities Convention: Human Rights of Persons with Disabilities or
Disability Rights?, 30 HUM. RTS. Q. 494 (2008).
156. Gerard Quinn, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities:
Toward a New International Politics of Disability, 15 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 33, 34 (2009).
157. Id. at 41.
158. Id. at 52.
159. Lisa Waddington, A New Era in Human Rights Protection in the European Community: The
Implications of the United Nations' Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities for the Euro-
pean Community (2007), available at http://ssm.com/abstract= 1026581.
160. Jacqueline Laing, Information Technology and Biometric Databases: Eugenics and Other
Threats to Disability Rights, 3 J. LEGAL TECH. RISK MGMT. 9, 22 (2008).
161. Penelope Weller, Human Rights and Social Justice: The Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities and the Quiet Revolution in International Law, 4 PUB. SPACE: J. L. & Soc. JUST. 74,
90 (2009).
1392011]
140 Law & Psychology Review [Vol. 35
The CRPD makes clear that persons with disabilities have the same
human rights as all other persons. 16 2 Multiple sections of the CRPD track
the holdings of the Wyatt decision and its supplemental standards. Thus,
Article 3 calls for "[r]espect for inherent dignity" and "nondiscrimina-
tion" ;163 Article 12, "[e]qual recognition before the law" ;l Article 13,
equal "[aiccess to justice";165 Article 14, "the right to liberty and security
of [the] person" ;166 Article 15, "[flreedom from torture or cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment"; 16 7 Article 16, "[flreedom from
exploitation, violence and abuse";16 8 Article 17, a right to protection of the
"integrity of the person";'6 9 Article 19, the right to community living; 70
Article 25, the right to health and the non-discriminatory provision of ser-
vices;17 and Article 26, the right to rehabilitation. 17 2
162. See Michael Ashley Stein, Disability Human Rights, 95 CAL. L. REv. 75 (2007).
163. CPRD, supra note 10, art. 3; Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 379 (M.D. Ala. 1972)
(stating that "patients have a right to privacy and dignity."); see also Lord, Suozzi & Taylor, supra
note 152, at 572 (discussing Article 3 of the CRPD).
164. CPRD, supra note 10, art. 12; Wyatt, 344 F. Supp at 379 ("No person shall be deemed
incompetent to manage his affairs, to contract, to hold professional or occupational or vehicle opera-
tor's licenses, to marry and obtain a divorce, to register and vote, or to make a will solely by reason of
his admission or commitment to the hospital."); see also Lord, Suozzi & Taylor, supra note 152, at
573-74.
165. CPRD, supra note 10, art. 13; Wyatt, 344 F. Supp. at 379 ("Patients shall have an unre-
stricted right to visitation with attorneys"); see also Wyatt, 344 F. Supp. at 378 ("[The Court has
determined that this case requires the awarding of a reasonable attorneys' fee to plaintiffs' counsel.");
see Terry Carney, Fleur Beaupert, Julia Perry & David Tait, Advocacy and Participation in Mental
Health Cases: Realisable Rights or Pipe-Dreams?, 26 LAW IN CONTEXT 125 (2008).
166. CPRD, supra note 10, art. 14; Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 785 (M.D. Ala. 1971)
("To deprive any citizen of his or her liberty upon the altruistic theory that the confinement is for
humane therapeutic reasons and then fail to provide adequate treatment violates the very fundamentals
of due process."); see also Rosemary Kayess & Phillip French, Out of Darkness Into Light? Introduc-
ing the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 8 HuM. RTs. L. REV. 1, 21 (2008).
167. CPRD, supra note 10, art. 15; Wyatt, 344 F. Supp. at 380 ("Patients have a right to be free
from physical restraint and isolation."); see also Lord, Suozzi & Taylor, supra note 152, at 573.
168. CPRD, supra note 10, art. 16; Wyatt, 344 F. Supp. 387, 401 ("The institution shall prohibit
mistreatment, neglect or abuse in any form of any resident."); see also Rangita de Silva de Alwis,
Mining the Intersections: Advancing the Rights of Women and Children with Disabilities Within an
Interrelated Web of Human Rights, 18 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 293, 307-08 (2009).
169. CPRD, supra note 10, art. 17; Wyatt, 344 F. Supp. at 391 n.7 (quoting plaintiffs' expert)
("The conditions I would say are hazardous to psychological integrity, to health, and in some cases
even to life."); see also Kiimpf, supra note 147; Bernadette McSherry, Protecting the Integrity of the
Person: Developing Limitations on Involuntary Treatment, 26 LAW IN CONTEXT 111 (2008).
170. CPRD, supra note 10, art. 19; Wyatt, 344 F. Supp. at 384 ("Each individualized treatment
plan shall contain . . . criteria for release to less restrictive treatment conditions, and criteria for dis-
charge."); see also Arlene S. Kanter, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities and Its Implications for the Rights of Elderly People Under International Law, 25 GA. ST.
U.L. REV. 527, 564-65 (2009).
171. CPRD, supra note 10, art. 25; Wyatt, 344 F. Supp. at 380 ("Patients have a right to receive
prompt and adequate medical treatment for any physical ailments."); see also Penny Weller, Sup-
ported Decision-Making and the Achievement of Non-Discrimination: The Promise and Paradox of the
Disabilities Convention, 26 L. CONTEXT 85 (2008).
172. CPRD, supra note 10, art. 26; Wyatt, 344 F. Supp. at 376 (The court-appointed Human
Rights Committee "shall have review of all research proposals and all rehabilitation programs, to
Abandoned Love
I am not suggesting that the Convention drafters kept a copy of Wyatt
close at hand during the drafting process. That would be asserting too
much. But I believe it is undeniable that the rights first articulated so elo-
quently by Judge Johnson in Wyatt-subsequently restated in modified
formats in cases decided by the regional human rights courts and commis-
sions-are the heart and soul of the U.N. Convention. It is conceivable, I
expect, that the CRPD might have been drafted as it was had Wyatt never
been decided as it was, and had Wyatt's progeny not given it additional
life in multiple U.S. jurisdictions. But I doubt it.
V. CONCLUSION
Wyatt exploded into the consciousness of public interest lawyers forty
years ago, 173 and that explosion irrevocably changed the course of Ameri-
can institutional conditions law for all time.1 74 Although its contemporane-
ous impact on legal developments in the United States has ebbed in the
aftermath of Youngberg v. Romeo,175 its legacy stands. And that legacy
informs and inspires the CRPD.
Professor Quinn sees the Convention as a reflection of the reality that
"the American disability rights revolution now belongs to all." 176 By not-
ing that "[t]he most important potential of the Convention is its potential to
transform the process that leads to those laws in the first place,"l 7 7 he en-
grafts that legacy of Wyatt-a case that transformed the entire legal
process as it affected persons with mental disabilities who were institutio-
nalized-on to the Convention itself. 17 8
Interestingly, Wyatt's use of international law has been rarely dis-
cussed and is mostly forgotten.17 9 Judge Johnson specifically noted:
It is interesting to note that the Court's decision with regard to the
right of the mentally retarded to habilitation is supported not only
by applicable legal authority, but also by a resolution adopted on
ensure that the dignity and the human rights of patients are preserved."); see also Kanter, supra note
170, at 565 n.150.
173. See Perlin, supra note 57, at 100.
174. See generally 2 PERLIN, supra note 2, chapter 3.
175. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
176. Quinn, supra note 156, at 51.
177. Id. at 47.
178. Id.; see also BARTLETT, LEWIS & THOROLD, supra note 90, at 262 ("For too long, people
with disabilities, and people with mental health problems and intellectual disabilities in particular,
were left at the margins of human rights discourse. A change has commenced, but only com-
menced.").
179. But see Koh, supra note 75, at 11, n.58; see also Gunnar Dybwad, From Feeble-Mindedness
to Self-Advocacy, A Half Century of Growth and Self-Fulfillment 11 (June 2, 1994) (paper presented at
the 118' meeting of the American Association on Mental Retardation), available at
http://www.mnddc.org/parallels2/pdf/90s/98/98-FFA-HSU.pdf.
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December 27, 1971, by the General Assembly of the United Na-
tions. That resolution, entitled "Declaration on the Rights of the
Mentally Retarded," reads in pertinent part: ". . . The mentally
retarded person has a right to proper medical care and physical
therapy and to such education, training, rehabilitation and guid-
ance as will enable him to develop his ability and maximum poten-
tial. io180
A discussion of the use by domestic courts of international human
rights law is beyond the scope of this paper.s8 But the coincidence here is,
to say the least, intriguing.
To a great extent, the mental disability law revolution has, until rela-
tively recently, largely been a domestic one. However, I expect that ratifi-
cation of the UN Convention-building on European jurisprudence and
cases such as Congo82 and Purohitl83 - has the capacity to radically alter
this reality.184 It is not a reach, I think, to predict that forty years from
now, we will look back at Wyatt's international influence and legacy as
being at least as or more profound and paradigm-shattering than its domes-
tic influence.
To conclude by returning to the Dylan lyric that begins my title, the
"love" shown in the Wyatt case for persons institutionalized in facilities
akin to concentration camps 85 may have been, to some extent, "aban-
doned" by US courts. But the CRPD, I hope, will allow such persons, in
Dylan's words, to finally "march in the parade of liberty. 186
180. Wyatt, 344 F. Supp. at 390 n.6.
181. See Michael L. Perlin & Valerie McClain, "Where Souls Are Forgotten": Cultural Competen-
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Conditions Litigation?, 27 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 675 (2009) (same).
182. Congo v. Ecuador, Case 11.427, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 63/99,
OEA/Ser.L/V/H.95, doc.7 rev. at 475 (1998).
183. Purohit and Moore v. The Gambia, Comm. No. 241/2001, 11 Int'l Hum. Rights Rep. 257
(Afr. Comm'n on Human and Peoples' Rights 2003).
184. See Weller, supra note 171, at 75 (discussing how the Convention reflects a "quiet revolu-
tion" in human rights/mental disability law).
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